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T IS common for a word to have more than one meaning. This
causes few problems when each definition is reasonably precise,
the differences are well known, and the appropriate meaning of the
word can be inferred from the context in which it is used. Difficul-
ties arise, however, when significantly different meanings of a word
are not recognized. In policy making situations, this can lead to
errors when decisions are based on the implications of a theory in
which the specific technical definition of a key word differs funda-
mentally from the meaning policy makers ascribe to that same
word.
The word "market" suffers from such confused usage when it is
applied to air transportation matters. In an effort to reduce this
confusion, this article will identify important definitional differences
in this word, demonstrate how a theory based on one definition is
applied inappropriately to a situation when an entirely different
definition is meant, and give an illustration of how the word "mar-
ket" can be used consistently in cases in which antitrust policies
are applied to air transportation.
DEFINITIONAL DIFFERENCES
Economic definition
In economic theory, a market is simply "a place or device en-
abling people to negotiate exchange."' The important phenomenon
*Dr. Jordan is professor of managerial economics at York University, Tor-
onto, Canada. This article is a somewhat modified version of a paper presented
at the Western Economics Association Annual Conference on June 10, 1974.
'A. ALcHImN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 56 (3d ed. 1972).
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of exchange can be illustrated by use of the Edgeworth Box where
two individuals are both shown possessing some amounts of two
different goods. The analysis predicts that if the initial allocation
results in these individuals valuing the two goods differently (that
is, having different marginal rates of substitution between them),
both can achieve more preferred combinations of the goods through
exchange. Thus, Mr. A, who values a unit of one good more highly
in terms of the second than does Mr. B, gets more of the first good
by offering some of the second good to Mr. B (and vice versa).
This exchange continues until their marginal rates of substitution
between the goods become equal.' This technical description of a
simple two-person, two-good economy is useful in emphasizing the
fundamental exchange characteristic of markets in the more com-
plex situations which usually exist when many individuals and firms
exchange many different goods for money which serves as a proxy
for other goods.
Transportation Definition
When considering physical goods, it is relatively easy to differen-
tiate between the geographic location of the market (where ex-
change occurs) and the location(s) of the goods. These locations
may be identical as in the case of the ordinary retail store, or they
can be quite separate, as in the case of commodity exchanges.
When, however, goods are services such as transportation, univer-
sity education, or medical care, this clear independence of the mar-
ket (exchange) location and the location of the good itself no
longer exists. One can, of course, exchange a claim to airline pas-
senger transportation for money at some remote location, but in
order for the purchaser to benefit from such exchange he or an
employee or a family member must be physically present at the
time and place the service is produced. Contrast this to the situa-
tion in which individuals benefit through the exchange of futures
contracts when at no time need they be anywhere near the com-
modities in question.
The necessary presence of the traveler, student, or patient at the
time and place of production tends to associate the market (ex-
change) location of a service with its production location. Further-
more, the inherent geographic factors in transportation reinforce
2 Id. at 47-49.
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the confounding of the place of exchange with the place of produc-
tion. Combined, these circumstances have resulted in customary
reference to pairs of cities or pairs of metropolitan areas as trans-
portation "markets"--such as the "Los Angeles-New York mar-
ket." Obviously, this transportation definition of the word "market"
is quite different from the economic definition with its emphasis on
exchange. This inconsistency could be eliminated, however, simply
by focusing on the difference between the function of exchange and
the function of production. Thus, rather than speaking of the "Los
Angeles-New York market," it would be definitionally consistent
and, therefore, analytically more useful, to refer to the "Los Angeles
market" (exchange location) for service to New York, or Chicago,
or San Francisco, or Toronto (the specific goods being produced).
To use an analogy to physical goods, even though automobiles may
be assembled in Detroit and then shipped to Los Angeles for sale,
one speaks of the Los Angeles market for automobiles rather than
the Detroit-Los Angeles market.
To make the dichotomy between transportation exchange and
transportation production a bit more concrete, consider the physi-
cal facilities that are used in each activity. The facilities for the Los
Angeles airline passenger transportation market are comprised of
the local telephone network providing the prospective traveler with
toll-free access to the airline reservation office, ticket offices located
at the airport and in downtown centers, and travel agent offices
providing more complete sales coverage throughout the area. In
contrast, the facilities used to produce the actual airline passenger
service between city pairs are comprised of aircraft, maintenance
installations, airport terminals, runways, airways, communication
networks, etc.
Department of Justice Definition
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) uses a compound mar-
ket definition for airline passenger transportation. In its brief to
the Civil Aeronautics Board Hearing Examiner in the American-
Western Merger case, the Department stated that:
Relevant markets are determined under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act according to the line of commerce (product market) and the
section of the country (geographic market) affected. The antitrust
laws do not focus on rigid definitions of either product or geographic
1975]
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markets, but rather seek to determine the competitive consequences
in as many relevant markets and submarkets as are meaningful,
based on the economic facts in the particular industry at hand.'
The DOJ then specified the relevant product market for this case
as "scheduled domestic passenger service," and it went on to say
that "domestic trunkline passenger transportation is a 'well-defined
submarket . . . for antitrust purposes.' "' Given the implicit level
of aggregation in these definitions, there is little reason to argue
about this product market concept. Airline passenger service is in-
deed an operationally identifiable product market with the empha-
sis being placed on the adjective rather than the noun. In other
words, airline passenger service is a distinct product relative to pas-
senger services provided on buses, railroads and in automobiles,
and even more distinct relative to freight and other transportation
services, or any of a multitude of other goods.
Turning to the geographic market aspect, the DOJ stated that
"(t) he relevant geographic markets for analyzing trunk airline
mergers are national, regional and city pair markets."' On an ag-
gregate basis, it is consistent with economic usage to define geo-
graphic markets in terms of national, as opposed to international,
and regional, as opposed to national, areas for airline passenger
service. This is no more aggregative than referring to national or
regional markets for the many differentiable goods classified under,
say, Motor Vehicles and Parts (Standard Industrial Classification
3717). Furthermore, the national and regional usages are consis-
tent in that they both deal with contiguous geographic areas en-
closed by specific borders. In most cases, individuals and firms (the
Mr. A's and Mr. B's) within these borders find it less costly to ex-
change goods with each other than with individuals and firms lo-
cated elsewhere. Also, various suppliers in the areas provide closer
alternatives, and thus greater rivalry, for each other than do sup-
pliers located in other countries or regions.'
' Brief of the United States Department of Justice to the Hearing Examiner,
In the Matter of the Application of American Airlines, Inc. & Western Air Lines,
Inc. For Approval of Merger, CAB Docket No. 22916 (August 31, 1971), p. 3,
mimeographed. The CAB denied this merger application, CAB Order No. 72-7-91
(July 28, 1972).
41 d. at 4.
5 Id. at 5, citing Recommended Decision, American-Eastern Merger Case,
CAB Docket No. 13355 (1962).
6 "The basic empirical problem of market definition is to define the range of
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The Justice Department's consistency in geographic defimtions
breaks down when it adopts the concept of "city-pair markets" as
the smallest geographic classification. In the first place, as already
mentioned, a city pair actually defines a specific transport product
-airline passenger service between Los Angeles and New York,
for example. In the second place, a city pair generally pertains to
two noncontiguous locations rather than to a contiguous area
where consumers and producers find it convenient to carry out ex-
change. Actually, rather than being a relatively small area, a city
pair can cut across and extend beyond regional or national bound-
aries. Thus, the Los Angeles-Chicago city pair extends between two
quite different regions, and the Los Angeles-Toronto city pair in-
cludes two different countries, or national markets. Instead of using
"city-pair markets," the DOJ's geographic market definition would
be conceptually consistent in descending order of geographic mar-
ket size if it adopted the city (or metropolitan area) as the smallest
market designation, as for example, the Los Angeles market for air-
line passenger service to and from Chicago or Toronto.
It is only fair to emphasize that the DOJ should not be held re-
sponsible for proposing the "city-pair market" concept. It merely
adopted the wide-spread and long-established usage that has devel-
oped over time among the airlines, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), and many scholars of air transportation. This writer, for
one, is guilty of the extensive misuse of the word "market" to refer
to city pairs,' and in part this paper is being written to redeem past
sins in this regard. A reading of any significant CAB decision or
staff study regarding route awards or fares for certain city pairs
will reveal the same misuse, and it is similarly commonplace among
airline employees. At the same time, however, it should be noted
that despite their misuse of the word "market," airlines organize
their marketing activities in ways that are consistent with the eco-
nomic definition. All airlines have national marketing headquarters
alternatives to which a buyer or seller may practicably turn and to identify the
sets of transactions whose outcomes are sufficiently interrelated that to subdivide
them further invites error. One definition of an industry is as 'a gap in the chain
of substitutes'; a parallel definition of a market is as 'a gap in the chain of alter-
natives.'" Steiner, Markets and Industries, 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 577 (1968).
'W. JORDAN, AIRLINES REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFEC-
TIONS (1970).
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and most have decentralized regional structures.8 They also have
local marketing organizations covering contiguous areas around
various cities. These local units undertake appropriate local pro-
motional activities and their sales representatives canvass large con-
sumers and travel agents in the area. Thus, an airline may have
a Los Angeles sales organization, a Chicago sales organization, and
one in New York, but it will not have a Los Angeles-Chicago or a
Los Angeles-New York sales organization.
The purpose of this paper is not to say that it is inherently wrong
to use the work "market" to mean city-pair service. Any definition
is correct providing its meaning can be discerned and used con-
sistently. What is wrong is when theories and concepts based on
one usage of the word are unknowingly applied incorrectly to cir-
cumstances when some other usage is meant. An example of this
is given to the following section.
USE AND MISUSE OF THE MARKET DEFINITION
National and City-Pair Definitions
Over twenty years ago Professor Bain proposed the hypothesis
that high concentration ratios for the eight largest firms in a speci-
fied industry yield increased market power and above-average ac-
counting rates of return for such large firms." A number of other
scholars have endeavored to test this important hypothesis, but have
obtained mixed results.10 Even so, the federal courts and the DOJ
have implicitly or explicitly used Bain's hypothesis as one basis for
evaluating mergers between firms with large shares of relevant mar-
kets under section 7 of the Clayton Act." For example, in its brief
to the hearing examiner in the American Western Merger Case, the
DOJ made the following statements:' 2
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court held
that a merger which produced a 30 percent market share for the
6See e.g., UAL, INC. ANNUAL REPORT 1973 March 11, 1974, at 5-6.
Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manu-
facturing, 1936-1940, 65 Q. J. EcON. 293 (1951).
10 See e.g., Brozen, The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommenda-
tion, 13 J. LAW & ECON. 279 (1970); Mann, Seller Concentration, Barriers to
Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 48 REV. ECON. & STAT. 296
(1966); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
'2Supra note 3, at 11 and 12-13, respectively.
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surviving firm with the four largest firms having 78 percent of the
market was well above the market share which would bring illegal-
ity under the Clayton Act. The Court based its findings on related
cases and scholarly opinion that a 20 percent market share should
be prima facie unlawful.
Although largely developed from precedents involving unregul-
lated industries, the Department of Justice merger guidelines under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provide an additional reference point
for determining excessive market share. Under those guidelines,
mergers are normally challenged if the merging firms have the fol-
lowing market shares:
MARKET SHARE PERCENTAGE






The DOJ pointed out that "America's share of total domestic
trunkline revenue ton miles for calendar 1970 is 18.2 percent, and
Western's is 4.4 percent; combined, they are 22.7 percent."" Since
the Big Four trunklines (American, Eastern, TWA and United)
then accounted for 68.7 percent of domestic trunk revenue ton
miles, the DOJ asserted that "Under the Clayton Act, it is clear that
in a market as concentrated as the domestic trunk airline industry,
the creating of a market share as large as American-Western's
would be illegal."1
This usage of aggregated national market shares and concentra-
tion ratios was consistent with the market definition adopted by
Bain and, therefore, to whatever extent Bain's hypothesis applies to
regulated rather than nonregulated industries, the DOJ could em-
ploy it to predict carrier performance. It happened, however, that
the DOJ and other parties in this case went one step farther and
calculated the "market shares" given in Table I for the four city
pairs where both American and Western provide single-plane ser-
vice.
"Id. at 10-11. Percentages do not add correctly because of rounding.
14Id. at 11.
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TABLE I
"Market Shares" in the Four City Pairs Served by American and Western
Year Ended June 30, 1970
"Market Shares"
City Pair Total No. (Percent of Total On-Line O&D
of Carriers Passengers, Year Ended June 1970)
American Western All Others
Los Angeles-Phoenix 5 24 28 48
Los Angeles-San Diego' 5 16 16 68
Phoenix-San Diego 3 32 66 2
b
Phoenix-San Francisco 4 47 13b 40
'Excludes data for two California intrastate carriers.
b Nonstop service not authorized by the CAB.
Sources: Recommended Decision of William J. Madden, Hearing Examiner,
American-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 22916 (December 20,
1971), p. 6, mimeographed.
Brief of the United States Department of Justice to the Hearing Ex-
aminer, In the Matter of the Application of AMERICAN AIRLINES,
INC., and WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. For Approval of Merger,
Docket No. 22916 (August 31, 1971), p. 8, mimeographed.
Official Airline Guide (July 1, 1970).
These percentages led the DOJ to assert that this merger would
lessen competition in these "significant city-pair markets," implying
that "market shares" of 32 to 98 percent would result in undesir-
able reductions in service quality."5 This assertion has considerable
intuitive appeal, but cannot claim support from Bain's hypothesis
since its city-pair market definition is inconsistent with his definition
of a market.
A few studies have indicated that under CAB regulation service
quality is improved when a second carrier is authorized to provide
nonstop service in a city pair that was previously served by only one
carrier." In addition, one recent study asserts that three is the criti-
cal number of carriers and that "when there are 1 or 2 airlines, the
monopoly solution tends to prevail.' This is obviously an empirical
"I Id. at 7-8. Since the CAB effectively prohibits price rivalry or the entry of
new carriers, these aspects of carrier performance in relation to market shares
are not relevant in the regulated airline industry.
" M. Burstein, Restoring Competition in the Cleveland-New York, Chicago-
Cleveland, Detroit-Philadelphia, and Cleveland-Philadelphia Airline Markets,
CAB Staff Study, Economic Research Section, Planning, Programming and Re-
search Division, Bureau of Economics (June 1970); S. RICHMOND, REGULATION
AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION (1961) 235-57.
'A. De Vany, Is Efficient Regulation of Air Transportation Possible?, PER-
SPECTIVES IN FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY (Washington, D.C.: American
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question that deserves considerable study. If, however, either two
or three is the critical number of carriers, it follows that the Amer-
ican-Western merger would not have significantly reduced service
quality in the Los Angeles-Phoenix, Los Angeles-San Diego and
Phoenix-San Francisco city pairs. Indeed, only the Phoenix-San
Diego city pair would have experienced reduced service quality if
the critical number of carriers is two (but not if it is three), since
the proposed merger would have left only one carrier available to
provide nonstop service. Note that these analyses pertain to the
quality of service produced between individual city pairs. Thus,
they do not provide insights into whether or not American's eco-
nomic power would have increased significantly in the Los Angeles,
Phoenix, San Diego or San Francisco markets because of the elim-
ination of Western as a rival carrier in the four city pairs.
City Definition
While it is proper to criticize the DOJ and others for referring
to individual city pairs as markets rather than specific airline prod-
ucts, the fact remains that the DOJ was quite correctly endeavoring
to identify the effects of mergers on carrier performance in local
markets in addition to national markets. National data are useful,
but they may obscure relevant details which deserve attention.
Surely, there are appropriate ways in which to investigate the effects
of merger on local city markets, consistently defined.
The "market-share" data for the four city pairs do demonstrate
that had Western been allowed to merge with American, the local
Los Angeles market would have lost one supplier of two products
(Western, providing service to Phoenix and San Diego), the local
Phoenix market would have lost a supplier of three products (West-
ern's service to Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco) and
the local San Diego and San Francisco markets experienced similar
results. Had the only single-plane airline servive available at Los
Angeles, for example, been that operated to Phoenix and San Di-
ego, the proposed merger could have had a major impact on overall
air service available at Los Angeles. Actually, however, at the time
the case was being prosecuted in the CAB, Los Angeles had single-
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974-forthcoming not yet in
print). De Vany also asserts that the addition of a fourth, fifth or sixth carrier
appears to have no further effect on airline performance.
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plane servive by one or more carriers to approximately 135 cities
in the U.S., Canada and Mexico." Given this, just how important
would it have been to Los Angeles to lose one carrier providing
rival service with several other carriers to just two of those 135
cities?
An answer to this question would not be easy to obtain, but in-
formation regarding the following factors would be relevant:
(i) What percentage of all passengers originating in Los
Angeles customarily fly to and from Phoenix or San
Diego rather than other North American cities?
(ii) Would the surviving carrier reduce the combined service
between Los Angeles and Phoenix or San Diego and, if
so, would the three or more other carriers make up for
any reductions by increasing their schedules?
(iii) Assuming the service in the two city pairs was signifi-
cantly reduced because of the merger, to what extent
would people fly to other places instead of to Phoenix or
San Diego? For example, vacation travelers might find it
easy to substitute a trip to Tucson, Las Vegas or San
Francisco for one to Phoenix. Business travelers would
be more constrained in the short-run, but long-run ad-
justments such as office or plant relocations could be
feasible.
Origin and destination passenger surveys provide ample data re-
garding the first factor. The second factor would be more difficult
to estimate, but a series of studies of past carrier performance
should provide useful evidence on this matter. Accurate informa-
tion pertaining to the third factor would be quite difficult to obtain,
but community of interest data (such as tour destinations, hotel
registration surveys in resort areas, telephone call surveys, branch
plant/headquarters location data) could be useful here. Indeed,
by requesting this kind of information in merger proceedings the
CAB may obtain useful evidence that would not otherwise be
forthcoming.
Another useful way to investigate the impact of a merger on car-
rier performance in a local city market would be to compare each
18 OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE: QUICK REFERENCE NORTH AMERICAN EDITION
(1971), at 358-78.
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carrier's overall share of total originating or enplaning passengers
at each city served by both of the prospective merger partners. It
happened that American and Western were authorized to serve
fourteen airports in common (out of 48 on American's system and
42 on Western's system)." Thus, there was a relatively large amount
of overlap in the local markets they served even though they pro-
vided identical city-pair services (products) in only four of these
markets. Conceivably, it would be possible for the surviving carrier
to achieve a significantly stronger position in these local markets
by offering a broader range of city-pair services, by enjoying more
flexible and effective aircraft scheduling, and by combining adver-
tising and other local sales activities. Such would be especially
likely if only a few other carriers provided alternative service in
various markets. In the case of Salt Lake City, for instance, the
merger of Western into American would have left only one other
trunk carrier (United) and three local service carriers providing
service to that city. During the twelve months ending June 30,
1971, American and Western together accounted for 42.6 percent
of total enplaned passengers at Salt Lake City."0 Would a combined
American-Western have been able to garner even larger traffic
shares in that market?
Finally, useful information might be obtained by calculating
percentages of passengers originating in individual local markets
destined to various major regions in the U.S., Canada or Mexico.
It could be that the two carriers (in conjunction with other car-
riers) provide rival connecting services to smaller communities in
such regions through different gateways (and thus non-duplicated
city pairs). The deletion of such rival services could result in a
deterioration of the surviving carrier's performance. This factor
would not be important in all mergers, but its possible relevance
needs to be determined and should not be dismissed out-of-hand.
In all the above examples the focus would be on individual city
markets and the effects changes in local market shares would have
on carrier performance and domination in those markets. Obvi-
ously, much research needs to be done to provide useful evidence
19 Recommended Decision of William J. Madden, Hearing Examiner, Amer-
ican-Western Merger Case, Docket No. 22916 (December 20, 1971), at 3-4.
20Civil Aeronautics Board/Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation
Administration), Airport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Air Carriers
(12 Months Ended June 30, 1971), at 114.
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regarding these matters, but fundamental to effective research is
asking the right questions. Hopefully the above analysis has indi-
cated some of these questions and, as a result, information will be
forthcoming in future merger proceedings that will assist the CAB
in evaluating various proposals on a local as well as a national
basis.
AN ILLUSTRATION OF CONSISTENT USAGE
It is proper to criticize the CAB, the DOJ and others for incon-
sistently defining city pairs as "markets" and then incorrectly ap-
plying certain economic theory to analyses involving such "mar-
kets." Having done this, however, it is appropriate to indicate how
a market definition properly based on the local city (or metro-
politan) area may be helpful in evaluating the effects of a proposed
merger.
On July 6, 1972, Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) agreed to
purchase Westgate-California Corporation's 79 percent share of
the outstanding stock of Air California (ACL), to be followed by
the eventual merger of the two airlines.21 Since PSA and ACL are
California intrastate carriers, they are not subject to CAB regula-
tion. Therefore, the antitrust exemption provided by Section 414
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958"2 does not apply to these
carriers. This meant that for the first time since 1938, two airlines
of significant size proposed a merger that would be subject to the
section 7 provisions of the Clayton Act if it could be established
that they had sufficient interstate involvement to warrant federal
intervention under the Act. The DOJ filed a complaint against the
proposed acquisition on December 5, 1972," and the subsequent
legal actions served to delay the consummation of the acquisition
until the agreement was terminated by the two parties on July
2, 1973.-
Aggregate Market
An important question in this case was the composition of the
relevant markets. An aggregate national market definition was cer-
21 Air California, 1972 Annual Report (Reissued February 1, 1974).
22 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
21 United Status v. Pac. S.W. Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
24 See note 21 supra.
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tainly inappropriate since the two carriers were prohibited from
operating outside the State boundaries. A state-wide definition was
possible, but neither carrier operated north of San Francisco and
Sacramento, and they were legally prohibited from filing joint fares
with connecting CAB-regulated interstate carriers operating beyond
these cities. Also, both carriers emphasized service in the densely
populated centers extending 500 miles along the Pacific Coast from
San Diego to San Francisco and Sacramento. Therefore, it was
concluded that the relevant aggregate regional market was airline
passenger service (the product) operated in this "California Cor-
ridor" the geographic region.
The obvious way to define sales in this aggregate market would
have been to count all passengers utilizing the city-pair services
(individual products) offered between the thirteen airports then
served by Air California and/or PSA. There were five such airports
in the Los Angeles area (Los Angeles International, Burbank, Long
Beach, Ontario and Santa Ana-Orange County), three serving the
San Francisco area (San Francisco International, Oakland and San
Jose), and one each in San Diego, Palm Springs, Sacramento,
Fresno and Stockton. Operationally, Fresno and Stockton were
deleted from anti-trust consideration for two reasons. First, because
they were served by PSA, rather than Air California, the merger
would not change the intrastate carrier providing their service.
Secondly because the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC)
had only authorized PSA's service on April 25, 1972,' and there
were no traffic data publicly available regarding these local markets
at the time of the merger proceedings. The remaining eleven airports
yielded potential combinations of 55 city pairs, but as of the end
of 1972, Air California and PSA were authorized to operate single-
plane service between only thirty-six of these city pairs."6 Due to
the lag in publishing passenger data for the CAB-regulated carriers,
21 PUC Decision No. 79985 (1973). See Jordan, supra note 7, at 2-4 for in-
formation regarding the PUC's regulatory authority.
26 Of the remaining 19 city pairs, nine were comprised of very short-haul
segments among the Los Angeles area airports and such segments among the
San Francisco area airports accounted for three more. Five consisted of the city
pairs encompassing Palm Springs, on the one hand, and Los Angeles/Burbank/
Long Beach/Ontario/San Diego on the other, and the last two were Long Beach-
Oakland and Long Beach-San Jose. PUC, Present and Proposed Route Structures
of California Certificated Air Carriers and Routes Operated by C.A.B. Certificated
Air Carriers as of March 1, 1973, at 1, 1A, 11, 11A.
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the most recent data available at that time were for the year ending
June 30, 1971. The on-line origin and destination (O&D) pas-
senger traffic carried by all airlines in these thirty-six city pairs for
that year is given in Table II.
TABLE II
On-Line Origin and Destination Passengers Carried by All Airlines
in the 36 City Pairs Comprising the "California Corridor"
Year Ended June 30, 1971
On-Line O&D Passengers
Carrier Number Percent of Total
Intrastate















Sources: California Public Utilities Commission, Transportation Division, Intra-
state Origin-Destination Passengers for 12 Months Ending June 30,
1971 and December 31, 1971, Exhibit No. 56 submitted in Applica-
tion No. 53442 (October 6, 1972).
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Origin-Destination Survey of Airline Pas-
senger Traffic-Domestic (Second Quarter 1971 Edition, Table 10,
Vol. IV-2-7; Washington, D.C.: Air Transport Association of Amer-
ica, 1972).
Looking at the percentages of total traffic for this regional mar-
ket, one can see why DOJ might be concerned about Air California
being merged with PSA. Alone, PSA carried 65 percent of total
traffic for this fiscal year, while Air California was the third largest
carrier with 9.9 percent of total traffic. A merger of these two car-
riers could well mean that PSA's share would increase to 74.9 per-
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cent of the total regional market. Indeed, since one or the other of
the two provided service for the entire year in only twenty-six of
the thirty-six city pairs, and for just part of the year in five more
(intrastate carrier service was inaugurated in the remaining five
city pairs after June 30, 1971), it could reasonably be predicted
that following the merger their full share of the California Corridor
market would exceed 75 percent.
Local Markets
Impressive as the regional market data are, they do obscure an
important consideration. Even though both Air California and PSA
served the four largest population centers in the State, it happened
that the PUC issued their route authorizations in such a way that,
out of the thirty-six city pairs, there were only four in which both
carriers provided service and thus produced the identical good."
Furthermore, these four city pairs accounted for relatively small
traffic flows-389,378 O&D passengers during fiscal year 1971,
or less than five percent of total regional traffic." Surely it could be
argued that, with these four minor exceptions, the merger would
merely result in Air California being replaced by PSA, thereby
leaving essentially unchanged the intrastate carrier share of each
city-pair "market." Given this, what difference would it make if
PSA, rather than Air California, provided service in the former
Air California "markets," especially since PSA had a long-estab-
lished reputation of providing excellent coach service at low fares?
On the face of it, this argument could claim support from eco-
nomic theory since the theory emphasizes the number of suppliers
of a product rather than the identity of individual firms in predict-
ing market performance. But such support requires consistency in
27 PUC, Present and Proposed Route Structures of California Certificated Air
Carriers Routes Operated by C.A.B. Certificated Air Carriers as of July 1, 1970,
at 1, 1A, 12, 12A; as of July 1, 1971, at 1, 1A, 10, 10A; and as of March 1,
1973, at 1, 1A, 11, 11A.
28 Id. The four city pairs were Sacramento-Ontario, Sacramento-San Diego,
San Diego-Oakland and San Diego-San Jose. Rival service had also been author-
ized between Burbank-Oakland and Burbank-San Jose. However, following thir-
teen month of operations, Air California terminated its service in those two city
pairs on January 14, 1970. Air California, Notice of Special Meeting of Share-
holders to be Held on April 7, 1970 (March 14, 1970), at 21. This general lack
of direct rivalry in the 36 city pairs was mainly due to the PUC's practice of
authorizing the two carriers to serve different airports in the Los Angeles area.
Also, Air California served Palm Springs while PSA did not.
21 Obtained from the sources specified for Table No. 2.
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the market definitions and the fact is that the city-pair definition is
inconsistent with the economic definition. The relevance of this
difference is indicated by the following illustration. Consider the
San Francisco market. While it is certainly true that San Francisco-
Santa Ana (served by ACL) and San Francisco-Los Angeles/Bur-
bank/Long Beach/Ontario (served by PSA) comprise five separate
city-pair services, these services are provided through adjacent air-
ports in the Los Angeles area. Thus, if there is evidence that serv-
ices to these five airports are close substitutes for each other, it
follows that PSA's replacing Air California in the San Francisco-
Santa Ana city pair would not merely be a case of a product being
supplied by one carrier instead of another. Rather, it would mean
that PSA's share of the local San Francisco market for services to
the Los Angeles area would have been increased by the merger.
Furthermore, if services to Oakland and San Jose are also close
substitutes for services to San Francisco International Airport, it
can be seen that all services among the thirteen city pairs connect-
ing the two areas would be substitutes for each other, both in the
local Los Angeles market and in the local San Francisco market.
Because eight of these services were provided by PSA and five by
Air California, it would follow that the merger would have sub-
stantially increased PSA's shares in the two markets for these close
substitutes as a group, regardless of there being only one intrastate
carrier operating between each of the thirteen city pairs after the
merger as well as before.
Because fares were either identical in the various city pairs or all
changed proportionally, it is necessary to rely upon indirect evi-
dence to determine whether or not individual city-pair services in
the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas are close substitutes.
Three kinds of evidence are helpful in this regard. First, the dis-
tances between the airports in each area provide an intuitive feel
for their substitutability. Secondly, airline scheduling practices indi-
cate whether or not the suppliers consider these products to be
close substitutes. Finally, the responses of passengers to new serv-
ices at the various airports indicate how users of airline services
view their substitutability.
Airport distances are quite simple to determine. In the case of
San Francisco, the three airports are located within twenty-nine to
thirty-five freeway/highway miles of each other, while the distances
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from downtown San Francisco to the Oakland airport is nineteen
miles, and it is around twenty-three miles from downtown Oakland
to San Francisco International." It is over forty miles from the San
Jose airport to downtown San Francisco or Oakland, so service at
this airport would be much less desirable to passengers traveling to
or from these downtown locations. At the same time, however, the
San Jose airport is very conveniently located for the large and
affluent population located between the San Jose and San Francisco
airports on the west side of San Francisco Bay, as well as the some-
what smaller population living on the east side of the Bay between
San Jose and Oakland. With the possible exception of peak rush-
hour periods, the driving times between any of these three airports
and the major population centers in this area do not exceed one
hour, and are generally much less. This is hardly an intolerable
barrier to air travelers.
The Los Angeles market area is somewhat more complicated.
The distances from downtown Los Angeles to the five surrounding
airports range from fourteen miles (Burbank) to forty miles (On-
tario and Santa Ana)." Of course, given the dispersion of popula-
tion in Los Angeles, the downtown area has less significance than
is the case in most cities. Looking at the airport locations, it turns
out that Santa Ana (on the south) is just nineteen miles from
Long Beach, which is twenty miles from Los Angeles International,
which is about twenty-eight miles from Burbank (on the north),
which is fifty-two miles from Ontario (in the extreme east), which,
finally, is forty-one miles from Anta Ana.' Certainly, with the
possible exception of Ontario, all these airports are located close
enough to another airport so that the transfer of service from one
to the other would not prevent large numbers of passengers from
actually traveling by air.
The airlines' belief regarding the degree to which services at
the various airports in each local market may be substituted for
one another is demonstrated by the relative numbers of scheduled
departures they perform at these airports. Each airport in these
two areas is surrounded by large numbers of people and enterprises.
10 H.M. Gousha Co., Street Guide and Metropolitan Map of San Francisco
Peninsula, Central Section (1966).
"1H.M. Gousha Co., Los Angeles Street and Vicinity Maps (1971).
82 Id.
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A dispersion of flights among the airports would indicate a per-
ceived need to provide specific services to each population group
and thus a low substitutability of service among the various air-
ports. In contrast, a concentration of flights at one major airport
in each market would be evidence that the airlines believe service
at one airport provides a close substitute for service at the other
"satellite" airports. The relevant information for the CAB-regulated
airlines is given in Table III.
TABLE III
Number of Scheduled Domestic Aircraft Departures Performed
With Fixed-Wing Aircraft by CAB-Regulated Airlines at Each Airport
in the Los Angeles and San Francisco Markets
12 Months Ended Dec. 31, 1964, June 30, 1971, and Dec. 31, 1972
Scheduled Domestic Departures Performed
Market and Airport Number Percent of Total
12/31/64 6/30/71 12/31/72 1964 1971 1972
Los Angeles
Hollywood-Burbank 3,032 3,848 3,687 2.8 2.3 2.4
Long Beach Municipal 1,770 1,194 1,180 1.7 0.7 0.8
L. A. International 94,424 151,146 139,148 88.4 90.2 88.7
Ontario International 4,668 8,796 9,574 4.4 5.2 6.1
Orange County (Santa Ana) 2,873 2,642 3,230 2.7 1.6 2.0
Total 106,767 167,626 156,819 100.0 100.0 100.0
San Francisco
Metropolitan Oakland 7,327 7,047 6,994 9.6 6.0 6.3
S. F. International 63,378 103,565 97,691 83.1 88.9 87.8
San Jose Municipal 5,526 5,939 6,578 7.3 5.1 5.9
Total 76,231 116,551 111,263 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: CAB/DOT(FAA), Airport Activity Statistics of Certificated Route Air
Carriers, 12 Months Ended December 31, 1964 (1965), Part II, Table
3; 12 Months Ended June 30, 1971 (1973), Table 7; and 12 Months
Ended December 31, 1972 (1974), Table 7.
These data show that the CAB-regulated airlines have consist-
ently provided about 88 percent of all their scheduled departures
through one major airport in each local market. This demonstrates
that they do indeed consider service at one airport to be a close
substitute for that provided through adjacent airports.
The response of passengers to the inauguration of services at
satellite airports provides additional evidence of the degree to which
such services are substitutes for that offered at major airports. A
rapid and large passenger response to new service (at comparable
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prices) at an airport would indicate that much of this is existing
traffic diverted from adjacent airports. A relatively slow develop-
ment of traffic in response to new service would indicate that the
traffic is comprised of newly generated passengers from the local
area who had not heretofore utilized air service when traveling, or
who had not traveled at all because of the lack of such service. In
other words, people who are already traveling by air will respond
quickly to new, rival services which are close substitutes for existing
services, but newly generated traffic will be relatively slow to ap-
pear since it entails a greater change in purchase patterns.
Starting in 1966 and 1967, PSA and Air California inaugurated
low-fare coach service at satellite airports around Los Angeles and
San Francisco. Initially these services connected a satellite airport
in one area with the major airport in the other area (for example,
Los Angeles-San Jose and Santa Ana-San Francisco), but by late
1967 new services were being inaugurated between two satellite
airports (such as between Santa Ana, Burbank or Ontario on the
one hand, and San Jose or Oakland on the other). Table IV com-
pares the passenger traffic moving between all possible city pairs
on all single-plane or connecting services existing prior to 1966,
with that moving on the new single-plane services of PSA and Air
California starting in 1966.
It can be seen from Table IV that traffic growth in the existing
services essentially stopped following the inauguration of new
services by PSA and Air California at the satellite airports despite
the fact that total traffic moving between the Los Angeles and
San Francisco areas showed a remarkably constant annual increase
of about 600,000 passengers for 1966-68 on top of the roughly
450,000 annual increase for the three prior years. Actually, 1966
was the last year of significant traffic growth in the existing serv-
ices, and much of this was probably due to the fact that the first
of the new services was not inaugurated until May 18 of that
year, and then only in the Los Angeles-San Jose city pair. The
industry-wide recession of 1969-71 saw a reduction in traffic car-
ried on the existing services while the new services continued to
register gains. By 1971, the first year in which all the new services
were available for the entire period, they accounted for 41.4 per-
cent of total O&D passengers flying between Los Angeles and San
Francisco. Then, in 1972, when there were no new service inaugu-
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TABLE IV
Passenger Response to New Services Inaugurated Between
Los Angeles and San Francisco Through Satellite Airports
Number of O&D Passengersa Flying Between Index Number
LAXIBURILGB/ONT/SNA and SFO/OAK/SJC 1966 = 100
Year Existing New Annual Increase Existing
Services Services Total in Total Services Total
1962 1,601,933 - 1,601,933 - 48.3 44.8
1963 2,051,585 - 2,051,585 449,652 61.8 57.4
1964 2,483,788 - 2,483,788 432,320 74.8 69.5
1965 2,971,070 1 ,9 7 6 b 2,973,046 489,258 89.5 83.2
1966 3,318,473 254,630- 3,573,103 600,057 100.0 100.0
1967 3,328,468 850,523 4,178,991 605,888 100.3 116.9
1968 3,408,083 1,397,620 4,805,703 626,712 102.4 134.5
1969 3,278,498 1,921,724 5,200,222 394,519 98.8 145.5
1970 3,127,765 1,998,358d 5,126,123 - 74,099 94.3 143.5
1971 3,081,514 2,175,1734 5,256,687 130,564 92.9 147.1
1972 3,263,446 2,328,2974 5,591,743 335,056 98.3 156.5
a True O&D passengers for the CAB-regulated carriers, on-line O&D passen-
gers for the California intrastate carriers.
b PSA temporarily service between Los Angeles and San Jose from October 8
through October 11, 1965.
c PSA inaugurated permanent service between Los Angeles and San Jose on
May 18, 1966. These data are for that city pair from May 18 to December 31,
1966.
d Includes 3,840, 19,650 and 15,240 true O&D passengers carried by Con-
tinental between San Jose and Burbank/Ontario during 1970, 1971 and 1972,
respectively.
Sources: California Public Utilities Commission:
Transportation Division, Intrastate Origin-Destination Passengers of
Scheduled Air Carriers-Totals by Carrier, Report No. 1511 for the
years 1962-72.
, Traffic Data, exhibit submitted in Application No. 52970
(February 11, 1972).
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, Domestic Origin-Destination Survey of
Air Passenger Traffic, 1961-65 (Washington, D.C.: Air Transport
Association of America, 1962-66).
rations, the traffic growth for both groups of services was similar
(5.9 vs. 7.0 percent). Clearly, passengers quickly switched their
patronage to the new services as they were introduced.3 This rapid
acceptance could only have happened had most of the passengers
already been air travelers between the two areas, and thus one can
conclude that these passengers considered the new services through
" This conclusion is supported by detailed analyses of the ten city pairs re-
ceiving new services between 1967 and 1970.
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the satellite airports to be close substitutes for the existing services.
The above analyses combine to demonstrate that flights provided
at the five airports in the Los Angeles area all provide services
which are close substitutes for services at one or more adjacent
airports.' The same conclusion applies to the three airports in the
San Francisco area. Therefore, the relevant local geographic mar-
ket in each of these two instances is indeed comprised of the entire
area encompassing all airports rather than separate areas surround-
ing each individual airport. It follows that there were five relevant
local geographic markets for the PSA-Air California acquisition-
Los Angeles (served through five airports), Palm Springs, Sacra-
ment, San Diego (each served through one airport), and San
Francisco (served through three airports). Furthermore, it can be
seen that PSA and Air California could not correctly argue that,
with the exception of the four city pairs they both served, the
acquisition would simply result in Air California being replaced
by PSA so that there would be no change in intrastate carrier mar-
ket share in each city-pair "market" following the merger. To the
contrary, as shown in Table V, PSA's shares of each of the five
local markets would be increased by the merger.
Given the federal courts' concern regarding post-merger market
shares in excess of 20 percent it seems reasonable for the DOJ to
have challenged a merger which yields local market shares for
regional traffic of 35 to over 80 percent. Whether or not the fed-
eral courts would have prohibited the proposed merger will not
be known due to the voluntary termination of the acquisition agree-
ment. Of course, the question could be answered should Air Cali-
fornia and PSA again propose to merge. If this occurs, and if the
above local market definition is adopted in that proceeding, one
might expect ACL and PSA to seek to calculate their market shares
in the local California markets on the basis of total national pas-
senger traffic rather than regional traffic. This would be based on
the argument that various interstate services provide substitute air-
line products to the intrastate services operated by the two carriers.
A rough idea of how market shares might look in such a situation
4 The PUC, PSA, and a representative of the Los Angeles Department of
Airports have come to the same conclusion in this matter. See, e.g., PUC Deci-
sions No. 74114 (1968); PUC Decision No. 75297 (1969).
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TABLE V
Market Shares of Total Regional Traffic
For the Markets Served by Air California and PSA
12 Months Ended June 30, 1971
Number of Originating Passengers* Market Share (%)
Market ACL PSA CAB Total ACL -PSA7-CAB
Regulated Reg.
Los Angeles 519,182 3,417,056 1,438,722 5,374,960 9.6 63.6 26.8
Palm Springs 876 - 1,610 2,486 35.2 - 64.8
Sacramento b 80,693 55,670 136,363 b 59.2 40.8
San Diego 6,894- 271,289 66,469 344,652 2.0 78.7 19.3
San Francisco 284,005 1,565,888 567,039 2,416,932 11.7 64.8 23.5
Total 810,957 5,334,926 2,129,510d 8,275,393d 9.8 64.5 25.7
a Since the actual origins of on-line passengers traveling between individual
city pairs is not published, the number of passengers originating in each local
market was estimated by allocating city-pair O&D passengers on the basis of
the following 1970 population data: Los Angeles = 9.1 million, Palm Springs =
0.1 million, Sacramento = 1.0 million, San Diego = 1.4 million, and San
Francisco = 4.2 million.
b ACL inaugurated service at Sacramento in September 1971. Therefore, there
will be a reallocation of market shares from PSA and the CAB-regulated car-
riers to ACL for periods subsequent to June 30, 1971.
ACL inaugurated service at San Diego in November 1970. Therefore, these
data are for an eight-month period and will doubtless be larger for periods sub-
sequent to June 30, 1971.
' Total is larger than in Table No. 2 due to the inclusion of six city pairs
which becomes appropriate due to the adoption of the local market definition.
The city pairs are: LGB-OAK/SJC and PSP-LAX/BUR/LGB/ONT.
Sources: Same as Table II.
Also, Rand McNally Road Atlas (49th ed. 1973), p. 118.
is given in Table VI where calendar year 1970 true O&D data for
the CAB-regulated airlines are combined with fiscal year 1971 on-
line O&D data for Air California and PSA.'
It would seem that, given existing federal court decisions, local
market shares for total domestic traffic of between thirty-three to
forty-six percent offer Air California and PSA little relief from
the provisions of the Clayton Act. This, however, is not the key
point of this article. The important factor here is that a consistent
definition of markets yields data that can be properly evaluated in
terms of existing economic theory and court precedents.
1' The low traffic growth during 1970 and 1971 (see Table No. 4) should re-
sult in only small errors due to this combing of data from overlapping periods.
Note that there has been no effort made to allocate O&D passenger totals between
points of origin and destination. Therefore, there is double counting in these data.
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TABLE VI
Market Shares of Total National Traffic
in the Major Markets Served by Air California and PSA
Composite Year 1970/71
Number of Passengers Originating/Terminating Market Share (%)
Market FY 1971 On-Line CY 1970 True Total ACL PSA CAB
ACL PSA CAB-Regulated Reg.
Los Angeles 749,277 4,640,737 11,044,000 16,434,014 4.6 28.2 67.2
Sacramento -a 589,468 676,000 1,265,468 -, 46.6 53.4
San Diego 33,149b 1,391,416 1,699,000 2,123,565 1.1b 44.5 54.4
San Francisco 794,500 4,048,231 7,520,000 12,362,731 6.4 32.8 60.8
ACL inaugurated service at Sacramento in September 1971. Therefore, there
will be a reallocation of market shares from PSA and CAB-regulated carriers to
ACL for periods subsequent to June 30, 1971.
"ACL inaugurated service at San Diego in November 1970. Therefore, these
data are for an eight-month period and will doubtless be larger for periods sub-
sequent to June 30, 1971.
Sources: Same as Table I.
CAB, Handbook of Airline Statistics (1971 ed., 1972), p. 407.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that confusion over the meaning of the word
"market" serves to reduce the usefulness of economic theory in
the formulation of transportation policies and, subsequently, in
the making of decisions that are consistent with these policies. It
is especially unfortunate because the confusion is easy to eliminate.
One simply has to recognize that service between a particular city
pair is a specific transport product, not a "market," which one or
more carriers offer in exchange for other goods, represented by
money, in various national, regional and local markets. Given this,
it becomes perfectly feasible to collect information pertaining to
the relevant contiguous geographic market areas, consistent with
the established structure of economic theory and supportive em-
pirical findings. The analysis of such information in terms of the
existing fund of economic knowledge provides the basis for formu-
lating more accurate and reliable predictions regarding the results
of alternative decisions.
The cases discussed in this article are examples of how defini-
tional confusion can mislead decision makers concerning antitrust
implications of airline mergers. The same confusion affects de-
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cisions in still other areas of transport activity. Hopefully, the
recognition of this fundamental problem will help in the more




Subchapter I. General Provisions
Sec. 1. Policy and Purpose
(a) The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United
States to establish, as expeditiously as practicable, an air traffic
control system, which will be responsive to public safety and needs
and national objectives, and will serve the aviation needs of the
United States public, and postal service, and the national defense.
(b) The new and expanded Aviation Control System services
are to be made available as promptly as possible to all users of
the air space of the United States. In implementing this program,
care and attention will be directed toward providing services on
an economically equitable basis, and toward the full implementa-
tion of new technology concerning both quality and quantity of
avigation related services.
(c) In order to facilitate this development and to provide for
the widest possible participation by private enterprise, United
States participation in this system shall be in the form of a private
corporation, subject to appropriate government fiscal regulations.
It is the specific intent of Congress that all users have nondis-
criminatory access to this system, that maximum competition be
maintained in the provision of equipment and services utilized by
this system, that the corporation created by this statute be so
organized and operated as to maintain and strengthen develop-
ment of avigational technology, in that the activities of the cor-
poration created under this statute and of the persons or com-
panies participating in the ownership of the corporation shall be
consistent with the Federal Anti-Trust Laws.




(1) The term 'avigation control system' refers to a system of
radio, radar, computers and associated technological machinery
and methods whose purpose is to facilitate the movement of ve-
hicles, people and cargo by air for profit or pleasure.
(2) The term 'aviation travel' refers to the movement of per-
sons or cargo by air, or the operation of any vehicle or instru-
mentality free of any connection with the ground and in the air
space above the United States.
(3) The term 'research and development' refers to the con-
ception, design, and first creation of experimental or prototype
operational devices for the control and/or regulation of aviation.
(4) The term 'aviation common carrier' has the same meaning
as the term 'common carrier' as when used in the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958, as amended.
(5) The term 'corporation' refers to the Aviation Corporate
Enterprise (ACE) as by subchapter III of this statute.
(6) The term 'administration' means the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration.
(7) The term 'department' means the Department of Transpor-
tation.
Subchapter II. Functions and Planning
Sec. 3. Executive Functions
In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes
of this statute the President of the United States shall:
(1) Aid in the planning and development and foster as expe-
ditiously as possible, the implementation of a national program for
an avigational system which is to be established and operated for
the least capital outlay consistent with safety;
(2) Provide for continuous review of all phases of the develop-
ment and operation of such a system, including the activities of an
avigational control system authorized under subchapter III of this
statute;
(3) Coordinate the activities of governmental agencies with re-
sponsibilities in the field of aviation, so as to insure that there is
full and effective compliance at all times with the policies set forth
in this statute;
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(4) Exercise such supervision over the corporation's relation-
ships with foreign governments or entities or with international
bodies as may be appropriate to assure that such relationships shall
be consistent with the national interest and foreign policy of the
United States;
(5) So exercise his authority as to attain coordinated and effi-
cient maximum utilization of the air space of the United States.
Sec. 4. Administrative Functions
The Federal Aviation Administration shall:
(1) Advise the Department of Transportation concerning the
desirable technical objectives of an avigational control system;
(2) Cooperate with the corporation in research and develop-
ment to the extent deemed appropriate to the public interest;
(3) Assist the corporation in the conduct of its research and
development program by furnishing to the corporation such testing
facilities and associated services as the corporation deems necessary
for the most expeditious and economical development of the avi-
gational control system;
(4) Consult with the corporation with respect to the technical
characteristics of the avigational control system;
(5) To the extent feasible, furnish such other services, on a re-
imbursable basis, to the corporation in connection with the estab-
lishment and operation of the system, as the corporation requests.
Sec. 5. Department Functions
The Department of Transportation shall:
(1) Insure that all present and future licensed personnel shall
have nondiscriminatory use of, and equitable access to, the aviga-
tional control system;
(2) Insure that the facilities of the avigational control system
are technically compatible and operationally interconnected with
each other and with existing air control facilities, including airport
control services, as necessary;
(3) Prescribe such accounting regulations and systems and en-
gage in such rate making procedures as will insure that any econo-
mies made possible by an avigational control system are appro-
priately reflected in user taxes, fares and rates;
(4) Grant appropriate authorizations for the construction and
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operation of each station in the avigational control system, either
to the corporation or to one or more of the authorized carriers or
the corporation and one or more such carriers jointly as will best
serve the public interest, convenience and necessity;
(5) Authorize the corporation to issue shares of capital stock
or to borrow any monies, or to assume any obligation in respect of
the securities of any other person upon a finding that such issuance,
borrowing, or assumption is compatible with the public interest,
convenience and necessity, and is necessary or appropriate for or
consistent with carrying out the purposes and objectives of this
statute by the corporation;
(6) Insure that no additions are made by the corporations or
carriers with respect to the facilities of the system unless such addi-
tions are required by the public interest, convenience and necessity
as determined by open public hearings at the location of the pro-
posed addition;
(7) Draft and enforce such rules and regulations as are neces-
sary to carry out the provisions and intent of this chapter.
Subchapter III. Avigation Control Enterprise
Sec. 6. Creation and Reservations
There is created an avigation control corporation for profit
which will not be an agency or establishment of the United States
government. The corporations shall be subject to the provisions of
this statute and, to the extent consistent with this statute, to the
District of Columbia Business Corporation Act. The right to repeal,
alter, or amend this statute at any time is expressly reserved. The
corporation is to be known as the 'Avigation Control Enterprise'.
Sec. 7.
The President of the United States shall appoint incorporators
who shall serve as the initial Board of Directors, for a period not to
exceed nine months, until the first annual meeting of stockholders.
Such incorporators shall arrange for an initial stock offering and
take whatever other actions are necessary to establish the corpora-
tion, including the filing of Articles of Incorporation as approved
by the President.
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Sec. 8. Corporate Structure
(a) The corporation shall have a Board of Directors consisting
of individuals who are citizens of the United States, of whom one
shall be selected annually by the President to serve as Chairman.
Two members of the Board shall be appointed by the President of
the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
effective the date on which the other members are elected and for
terms of three years or until their successors have been appointed
and qualify. The first two members of the Board so appointed shall
continue in office for terms of one and two years respectively, and
any member so appointed to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only
for the unexpired term of the director whom he succeeds. Two
members of the Board shall be elected annually by those stock-
holders who are aviation common carriers and three shall be elected
annually by public stockholders of the corporation.
No stockholder who is an aviation common carrier and no trus-
tee for such a stockholder shall vote, either directly or indirectly,
through the votes of subsidiaries or affiliated companies, nominees
or any persons subject to their direction, control, or employment
for more than two candidates for membership to the Board. Sub-
ject to such limitation, the Articles of Incorporation to be filed by
the incorporators, designated under Section VI of this statute shall
provide for cumulative voting under the relevant portions of the
District of Columbia Business Corporation Act.
(b) The corporation shall have a president, and such other of-
ficers as may be named and appointed by the Board, at rates of
compensation fixed by the Board, and serving at the pleasure of the
Board. No individual other than a citizen of the United States may
be an officer of the corporation. No officer of the corporation shall
receive any salary from any source other than the corporation dur-
ing the period of his employment by the corporation. No officer of
the corporation shall be employed by any Aviation common car-
rier, manufacturer or subsidiary for a period of six months prior
to, or 24 months subsequent to appointment or separation from the
corporation.
Sec. 9 Corporate Powers
In order to achieve the objectives and to carry out the purposes
of this statute, the corporation is authorized to fully utilize all the
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natural powers conferred upon a stock corporation by the District
of Columbia Business Corporation Act.
Sec. 10. Financing
(a) The corporation is authorized to issue and have outstanding,
and in such amounts as it shall determine, shares of capital stock,
without par value, which shall carry voting rights and be eligible
for dividends. The shares of such stock initially offered to the pub-
lic shall be sold at a price not in excess of twenty dollars ($20) for
each share and in a manner to encourage the widest distribution to
the American public. All other shares offered shall be offered at a
price of not less than two thousand ($2,000) dollars. Subject to
the provisions below, shares of stock offered under this sub-section
may be issued to and held by any person.
(b) For the purposes of this section the term 'common carrier'
shall mean a domestic or foreign common carrier which is speci-
fically authorized, or which is a member of a class of carrier au-
thorized, to own stock in the corporation upon a finding by the
administration that such ownership will not be inconsistent with the
public interest, convenience and necessity. Only those common
carriers which are so authorized shall own shares of stock in the
corporation at any time.
(c) At no time shall the aggregate of the shares of the voting
stock of the corporation owned by authorized domestic and foreign
carriers directly or indirectly exceed 50 percent of such shares
issued and outstanding. At no time shall any individual stockholder
who is not an authorized carrier or any syndicate or affiliated group
of such stockholders, own more than 10 percent of the shares of
voting stock of the corporation issued and outstanding.
(d) All proceeds for the user charge system developed by the
corporation pursuant to Section IV of the statute shall be utilized
by the corporation to further the goals outlined in this statute.
Subchapter IV. Miscellaneous Provisions
Sec. 11. Corporate Status
The corporation shall be deemed to be a common carrier within
the meaning of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and
as such shall be fully subject to the provisions of that act. Whenever
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the application of the provisions of this statute shall be inconsistent
with the application of the Federal Aviation Act, the provisions
of this statute will govern.
Sec. 12. International Activities
Wherever the corporation shall enter into business negotiations
with respect to facilities, operations, or services authorized by this
statute with any international or foreign entity it shall notify the
Department of State of the negotiations, and the Department of
State shall advise the corporation of relevant foreign policy con-
siderations. Throughout such negotiations the corporation shall
keep the Department of State informed with respect to such con-
siderations. The corporation may request the Department of State
to assist in the negotiations, and that Department shall render such
assistance as may be appropriate.
Sec. 13. Penalties and Sanctions
(a) If the corporation created pursuant to the statute shall en-
gage in any action or practice or policy inconsistent with the poli-
cies and purposes of this statute the district court of the United
States for any district in which this corporation resides or may be
found shall have jurisdiction upon petition of the Attorney General
of the United States to grant such equitable relief as may be neces-
sary or appropriate to prevent or terminate such conduct.
(b) The corporation shall not be liable for damages in any civil
action of any kind in any court of jurisdiction in any action related
to or concerning the provision of services to users. In all other re-
spects, however, the corporation is to be liable as an individual.
(c) It shall be the duty of the corporation and all aviation com-
mon carriers, to comply with all provisions of this chapter and all
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.
Sec. 14. Reports
(a) The President shall transmit to the Congress in January of
each year a report which shall include a comprehensive description
of the activities and accomplishments of the corporation during the
preceeding calendar year. In addition, the report shall include an
evaluation of such activities and accomplishments in terms of the
attainment of the objectives of this statute and any recommenda-
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tions for additional legislative or other action which the President
may consider necessary or desirable for the attainment of such ob-
jectives.
(b) The corporation shall transmit to the President and the Con-
gress, annually and at such other times as it deems desirable, a
comprehensive and detailed report of its operations, activities, and
accomplishments under this chapter.
(c) The Federal Aviation Administration shall transmit to the
Congress annually and at such other times as it deems desirable, a
report on its actions, activities and practices as they may apply to
the avigation control system incorporation, an evaluation of such
activities and actions with a view to recommending additional legis-
lation which the Federal Aviation Administration may consider
necessary or in the public interest.
Sec. 15. User Charges
The corporation shall formulate and submit to the Congress for
comment a schedule of charges to levy on all users of the Air Traf-
fic Control System herein established. Such system shall be reason-
able in nature and scope and shall not increase the current costs
incurred by the operator of any general aviation aircraft. Such sys-
tem of charges shall foster the growth of general aviation opera-
tions as essential to the national defense and postal needs of the
United States of America.
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